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FBI's Carnivore: Is the Government
Eating Away Our Right of Privacy?
INTRODUCTION
With the birth of the Internet has come a virtual reformation
of how human society communicates. The exact number of In-
ternet users is nearly incalculable, but recent assessments esti-
mate that nearly 300 million people worldwide are currently
online.' These users can travel relatively freely among the mil-
lions of currently active Internet sites.2 The growth of this commu-
nications medium in the last decade has been tremendous, and
promises to continue at such a pace. The United States Depart-
ment of Commerce has reported that less than 40 million people
worldwide had access to the Internet in 1996. 3 This number
jumped to more than 100 million people by the end of 1997.4 Fur-
ther research by the Department has indicated that the number of
people and businesses using the Internet doubles every 100 days.5
Thus, the Internet presents unprecedented opportunities for global
communications and commerce. However, it also poses dramatic
risks to personal privacy. Every day Americans use the Internet to
access and transfer vast amounts of private data. From electronic
mail and business transactions to shopping habits, web surfing
profiles can reveal detailed blueprints of how people live.6 As more
of our lives are conducted online and more personal information is
transmitted and stored electronically, the result has been a mas-
sive increase in the amount of sensitive data available to inter-
1. See Gavin Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Click-
stream Data, 6 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 61, 63 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See Thomas T. Reith III, Consumer Confidence: The Key To Successful E-
Commerce In The Global Marketplace, 24 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 467, 486 n.3
(2001).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Carnivore's Challenge to Privacy and Security Online: Hearings on
Carnivore Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong.
(2000) [hereinafter Carnivore's Challenge] (statement of Alan B. Davidson, Staff
Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology).
248 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:247
ested third parties, including the government.7 The question thus
presented is whether our government has taken advantage of this
availability. Although not conclusive, some evidence suggests that
the utilization of electronic surveillance for monitoring criminal ac-
tivity has practically exploded over the past decade, arguably re-
placing more traditional investigatory tools.8 Current data
indicates that this pace is unlikely to diminish. The FBI alone esti-
mates that over the next decade, given planned improvements in
the digital collection and analysis of communications, its requests
for electronic surveillance orders will increase 300 percent.9 It ap-
pears that these planned improvements, as well as additional sur-
veillance requests, may well be underway.
During Congressional hearings in April, 2000, Robert Corn-
Revere, an Internet and communications lawyer in Washington,
D.C., first divulged evidence of the existence of "Carnivore," an
electronic surveillance device developed by the FBI. 10 Responding
to concerns from various privacy groups and others, former Attor-
ney General Janet Reno ordered that an independent technical re-
view of the system be completed by December 8, 2000, in order to
substantiate Carnivore's compliance with both constitutional pro-
visions and federal statutory wiretap laws." The review, com-
pleted by the IIT Research Institute (IITRI), a division of the
Illinois Institute of Technology, essentially found the system to be
legally compliant and determined most concerns over invasion of
individual privacy were unsupported. 12
Despite winning a favorable review by the university, the Car-
nivore device continues to raise strong concerns about privacy and
the legal limits of government surveillance. 13 Many computer ex-
perts believe that the scope of the study was too narrow, and that
serious technical questions remain about the ability of Carnivore
to satisfy Constitutional and statutory thresholds for online secur-
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See John Hall, Privacy Beginning To Be A Top Issue, Rich. Times Dis-
patch, July 16, 2000, at F2.
11. See Frank James, U.S. Seeks University Experts to Review FBI's E-Mail
Probes, Chi. Trib., Aug. 25, 2000, at N20.
12. See Institute's Report on Carnivore Causes Uproar Among Critics, 4
Telecomm. Indus. Litig. Rep. 12 (2000).
13. John Schwartz, Computer Security Experts Question Internet Wiretaps, N.
Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2000, at A16.
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ity and safety.14 This note explores some important legal issues
raised by the operation of Carnivore, including a brief discussion of
the adequacy and conclusiveness of the IITRI analysis as it per-
tains to each issue.
Part I of this comment provides a basic assessment of the oper-
ational aspects of the Carnivore system. Part II explores the fun-
damental legality of the Carnivore device from a Constitutional
perspective. Part III examines Carnivore's likely compliance with
current federal statutory wiretap laws as they have been inter-
preted and applied by the judiciary. Finally, the conclusion offers
comments and proposals for how to strike a balance between pri-
vacy interests and government objectives.
I. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW OF CARNIVORE
As an initial matter, to understand the legal implications of
utilizing a surveillance system like Carnivore, one must under-
stand its basic operational capabilities. Although a fully detailed
description of how Carnivore works has not been made available to
the public, the general premise of the system is as follows:
Carnivore is a Windows NT based software program that oper-
ates upon connection to a network access point provided by a par-
ticipating Internet Service Provider (ISP).15 To install the device,
the FBI must present a valid court order to intercept electronic
communications of a target suspect.' 6 The court order may au-
thorize capture of an entire communication, or it can be limited to
addressing or routing information.' 7
The FBI and the ISP install Carnivore at a point on the ISP's
network where data from a suspect named in the court order is
located.' 8 As a technical matter, the FBI has conceded that the
ISP cannot provide an access point that can limit the Internet traf-
fic flowing through the Carnivore device to only that of the named
14. See id.
15. See The Carnivore Controversy: Hearings on Electronic Surveillance and
Privacy in the Digital Age Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) [hereinafter Hearings 11 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
16. See Big Sister - Janet Reno; An Orwellian Carnivore, Cincinnati Enquirer,
Sept. 13, 2000, at A10.
17. See Hearings 1, supra note 15 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
18. See id.
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suspect. 19 Because the Internet operates by breaking electronic
transmissions down into "packets" of data that are reassembled at
a destination point, Carnivore must necessarily separate or filter
the target suspect's electronic transmissions from other Internet
traffic as it flows through the device. 20
Once the named suspect's data is separated from other traffic,
Carnivore routes the information to a second filter.21 As the data
travels through the second filter, the system makes a copy of all of
the information and sends the original data to its desired destina-
tion.22 On the basis of authorized search parameters, Carnivore
segregates relevant and irrelevant data.23 Copied data that is not
relevant to the FBI investigation is purged. 24 Traffic that is rele-
vant to the investigation and defined under the court order is sent
to an archive system for permanent storage at an FBI facility.25
With these functional characteristics in mind, the fundamen-
tal legality of the Carnivore device can be examined from both a
constitutional and federal statutory perspective. Because this
comment focuses only on the inherent legitimacy of the system, as-
suming proper use, these analyses will be made ignoring any pos-
sibilities for misuse of the system on the part of the FBI.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Constitutional Issues Presented
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
[Tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
19. See James X. Dempsey, Does Carnivore Go Too Far?, Network World, Oct.
30, 2000, at 73; see also Dan Eggen & David A. Vise, More Questions Surface about
FBI Software; Wiretap Program Can Archive All Internet Communications, Nov.
18, 2000, at A03.
20. See Hearings 1, supra note 15.
21. Id.
22. See The Carnivore Controversy: Hearings on Electronic Surveillance and
Privacy in the Digital Age Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) [hereinafter Hearings 2] (statement of Donald Kerr, Asst. Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Hearings 1, supra note 15.
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but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. 26
The traditional judicial interpretation of a Fourth Amendment
search of persons, houses, papers and effects required some type of
physical invasion on the part of the government. 27 However, the
scope and interpretation of Fourth Amendment application was
broadened in 1967 when the Supreme Court of the United States
determined that a search, as defined by the Amendment, could be
accomplished via government orchestrated electronic surveil-
lance. 28 Thus, the constitutional implications created by the utili-
zation of the Carnivore surveillance device must be analyzed and
reviewed in such context. The primary Fourth Amendment con-
cerns raised by Carnivore can be narrowed to two issues.
Issue 1 - Warrantless Search of Persons Not Named In Court
Order
Because the FBI has conceded Carnivore's inability to isolate a
target suspect's transmissions as they flow through its first filter-
ing point,29 is the device able to conduct an unauthorized, warrant-
less search of communications of persons not subject to the
authorized surveillance?
Issue 2 - General Warrant Search of Target Suspect
Because the FBI has stated Carnivore copies and reviews, in
some manner, all electronic transmissions attributable to a suspect
named in a court order, 30 does the device conduct a general search
of the suspect's electronic communications not specified in the
order?
1. Examination of Fourth Amendment Concerns
The FBI has established that the Carnivore device reads cer-
tain "addressing" and "transactional" information for transmis-
26. U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).
27. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S 438 (1928); see also Clifford S.
Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo
and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 Cath. U.L. Rev. 277, 286 (1985).
28. See Fishman, supra note 27, at 395.
29. See Dempsey, supra note 19, at A03.
30. Id.
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sions flowing through Carnivore's first filter point.31 Much of this
information is not authorized in a valid court order and has no con-
nection to the approved purpose of the electronic surveillance. 32
The IITRI report seems to confirm that when Carnivore is used for
trap-and-trace surveillance to intercept simply the "to" and "from"
information on an e-mail, the software gives investigators more in-
formation than may be permitted by the court order, including the
length of e-mail messages. 33
Carnivore intercepts such material in one of two ways. First,
the device may receive the data without examining the actual body
of the transmission.34 Second, the system may view the address-
ing information only in conjunction with the body of the
communication. 35
As an initial matter, an individual raising a Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to a government search must show that the actions
of the government infringed upon his legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy.36 If the individual does not establish this reasonable expec-
tation, no Fourth Amendment search, and therefore violation, has
occurred. The judicially created test for determining whether an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an electronic
communication is a two-prong application developed in Katz v.
United States.37 The first prong of the analysis inquires as to
whether the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in
the communication. The second prong focuses on whether society
will recognize such expectation. 38 Thus, in order to establish that
Carnivore is conducting an invalid warrantless search of informa-
tion not subject to a court order, both prongs must be satisfied.
Subjective Expectation
Generally, to possess a subjective expectation of privacy, an
individual merely has to exhibit that he has some actual desire to
31. Hearings 2, supra note 22.
32. Id.
33. Jon Baumgarten, Official Report on Carnivore Supports E-Mail Surveil-
lance, 5 Cyberspace Law. 23 (2001).
34. Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
35. Id.
36. See Skok, supra note 1, at 71.
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. See id.
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keep the communication secluded or away from public access.3 9
With respect to most Internet transmissions, electronic mail in
particular, one can assume that most people have a strong actual
expectation of privacy in the content of messages they send and
receive. Safeguards such as login names, passwords and encryp-
tion procedures lend credibility to this assumption.
However, the existence of an actual expectation may become
less convincing when the communication is what has traditionally
been regarded as "addressing" or "transactional" information. The
ability of an individual to successfully claim an actual expectation
of privacy in electronic addressing and transactional data has been
addressed by the Supreme Court on two definitive occasions. In
Smith v. Maryland,40 the Supreme Court held that a person "in all
probability" does not have an actual expectation of privacy in the
telephone digits he dials because he voluntarily conveys such infor-
mation to a third party, the telephone company.41 Thus, the indi-
vidual assumes the risk that such information will be released.
Similarly, in United States v. Miller,42 the Court held that an indi-
vidual has no subjective expectation of privacy in bank records be-
cause he freely conveys this information to his bank in the
ordinary course of business. 43 The real issue to be addressed here
is whether such reasoning is applicable in the Internet arena.
Internet addressing and transactional material is generally ei-
ther Uniform Resource Locator (URL) data or Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses. 44 A URL is the "electronic address" a person types
when sending an electronic mail message.45 "JohnDoe@aol.com" is
an example of a URL address. An IP address is a computer's per-
sonal identification number that accompanies any electronic trans-
mission that is sent over the Internet from that particular
computer.46 An example of an IP address is 207.226.3.43.
As the Internet has become more and more of a pervasive part
of everyday life, some discussion has suggested that a traditional
39. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
40. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
41. See id. at 742.
42. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
43. Id. at 442.
44. See Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
45. See Tim Wyatt, Secure Shopping, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 27, 2000, at
3J; see also J. Timothy Hunt, Moving Target, Nat'l Post, Oct. 1, 2000, at 48.
46. Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
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analysis, such as that invoked in Smith and Miller, should not be
applied to the Internet forum. The basis for such a proposition is
the theory that Internet addressing information, unlike more
traditional addressing or transactional material, is much more re-
vealing of content. For instance, if an individual logs onto a partic-
ular Website and requests information, literature, etc., the request
message will be sent to that particular Website's URL address, or
mailbox.47 Therefore, if a person logs onto "WforPresident.com"
and requests information about the presidential campaign, how to
donate, etc., this request will be sent to the "WforPresident" Web-
site URL. Unlike telephone digits, which when viewed alone and
in the absence of further investigation reveal little if any element
of content, a simple Internet message such as this could expressly
illustrate a person's political affiliations. In fact, unlike telephone
numbers, the interception of URL information can give law en-
forcement a fairly comprehensive picture of the individual's inter-
ests and activities online.48 The FBI could know what type of
books an individual reads, his romantic and artistic interests, and
much more.49 Advocates against the application of traditional rea-
soning argue that such information is more analogous to a tele-
phone conversation than the digits dialed and thus should receive
Fourth Amendment protections.50
Substantial evidence of this protective approach makes it
plausible that Internet users have an actual expectation of privacy
in URL information being intercepted by Carnivore. In fact, many
privacy groups are concerned about the potential of Carnivore to
receive and record such information.51 For example, Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a Freedom of Information
lawsuit against the FBI in July 2000, requesting release of Carni-
47. Id.
48. See James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revi-
talizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 65
(1997).
49. See id.
50. See Randolph S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Net-
works and Data Privacy, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1181, 1201 (1995) (discussing how individ-
uals do not assume the risk that the content of their telephone conversations will
be disclosed by a third party (e.g. telephone company)).
51. See Michael J. Miller, The Ever-Expanding Browser, PC Magazine, Oct. 3,
2000, at 7.
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vore's capacity to view such information.5 2 The organization was
successful in obtaining over 2,000 Carnivore related documents
from the Justice Department.5 3 However, finding the provided in-
formation inconclusive, EPIC filed a motion in the District of Co-
lumbia in August, 2001 requesting the deposition of several FBI
officials in order to acquire further information regarding the de-
vice's ability to retrieve such data.5 4 Also, private software compa-
nies, in response at least in part to Carnivore's ability to intercept
URL information, have developed URL blocking software to pre-
vent such access.55 Similarly, many such companies have devel-
oped, or are in the process of developing less invasive surveillance
devices, emphasizing a less intrusive procedure and enhancing pri-
vacy protections.5 6
Alternatively, it would seem that a strong argument could rea-
sonably be made in favor of a traditional application of the Court's
reasoning in Smith and Miller with respect to Internet addressing
information. Although, very few courts have addressed the appli-
cability of such reasoning to the Internet forum, the courts seem to
agree that a traditional approach is appropriate. Proponents of
this position state that, like telephone digits and bank records,
URL information is voluntarily submitted to third parties. In-
ternet users must realize that they "convey" their URL information
since this information must travel through the ISP's network to
reach whatever destination is desired.5 7 Also, ISPs require In-
ternet users to choose a unique URL address in order to facilitate
delivery and transmission of electronic communications, much like
a telephone company does when it assigns telephone numbers.58
The analogy can go further. In Smith, the Court determined that
52. See Maria Mosquera, Privacy Group Wants Speedier Carnivore Disclosure,
Techweb News, Aug. 18, 2000.
53. See Epic Wants A Closer Look At 'Carnivore, Nat'l J. Tech. Daily, Aug. 13,
2001.
54. See id.
55. See Accelerated Networks Introduces Secure Multiservice Broadband Ac-
cess; DSLcon, Bus. Wire, Sept. 19, 2000.
56. See Ann Harrison, Don't Like Carnivore? How About Altivore? Open
Source Code Version of E Mail Sniffer in the Works, Computerworld, Sept. 25,
2000, at 12.
57. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (reasoning that an individual realizes that he must
convey phone numbers he dials to his telephone company since his call is com-
pleted through the company's switching equipment).
58. See Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L.
Rev. 1609, 1610-11 (1999).
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the individual voluntarily turns over addressing information to the
telephone company and thus assumes the risk that the company
will reveal the information to law enforcement. This assumption
must be made even though telephone companies normally do not
record every number dialed by a customer.59 Thus, although it is
quite probable that an ISP would not record every transmission
made, every transmission sent by a user must flow through the
ISP's server, and therefore the Internet user must assume the risk
that such information will be revealed to law enforcement.60
Applying the reasoning of Smith and Miller to IPs, address in-
formation may be an easier position to argue for those supporting
the traditional approach. Unlike URL information, IP addresses
are numerical, therefore much more like telephone numbers and
contain little, if any, content element. However, as with URL data,
some effort has been made to protect such information from public
access. On October 12, 2000, state representative Gene Green in-
troduced a bill that would prohibit ISPs from placing software
"cookies," a type of tracking and identification device, on consumer
IP addresses. 61 Also, the American Bar Association has created a
new website to help consumers avoid cookies as they shop online.62
This practical evidence suggests that individuals communicat-
ing over the Internet possess some level of a subjective expectation
of privacy in the URL and IP information that Carnivore uses to
conduct electronic surveillance. However, the real question in the
analysis is whether society is ready to recognize such an
expectation.
Society's Expectation
This second, and more difficult prong of the two part Katz test
to satisfy, addresses whether society is prepared to recognize a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the electronic communication.
The Supreme Court has stated that society is not willing to recog-
59. Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
60. See Skok, supra note 1, at 67.
61. See Drew Clark, Privacy: Green Introduces Online Privacy Policy Measure,
Nat'l J. Tech. Daily, Oct. 12, 2000.
62. See Sara Hazlewood, ABA Offers Tips to Help Consumers Protect Them-
selves on the Internet, 17 Bus. J. 7 (Dec. 3, 1999).
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nize an individual's expectation of privacy unless that expectation
is "objectively reasonable." 63
The Katz court defined objective reasonableness in the form of
a two-factor application. The first factor addresses whether the in-
dividual attempted to deny public access to his communication. 64
The second factor focuses on whether law enforcement has inter-
cepted the content of the individual's transmission.65
Katz involved the warrantless recording of a telephone conver-
sation an individual had in a public phone booth that had been
bugged by law enforcement officials. Applying these two factors,
the Court determined that the individual subjected to the surveil-
lance had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in using
the phone booth because he had taken steps to deny public access
to his conversation.6 6 Also, law enforcement had full access to the
content of the individual's phone conversation because they had
placed a recording device on the exterior of the booth itself.
In the years since Katz, at least with respect to those cases
where the Court has been presented with more traditional parame-
ters, 67 the Supreme Court's reasoning and application of determi-
native factors has been further verified.68 Where there is little, if
any established parameters, such as the Fourth Amendment's ap-
plication regarding the Internet, the analysis has tended toward a
narrow application of the Katz reasoning.69 In fact, the few judi-
cial decisions expressly addressing Internet transmissions have
applied the Katz reasoning very narrowly.70 For instance, in
United States v. Charbonneau,71 the court held that an individual's
expectation of privacy in electronic mail was significantly less than
that held in posted mail. 72 Also, in United States v. Kennedy,73 the
63. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
64. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
65. Id. at 354.
66. Id. at 347.
67. See Allegra Knopf, Privacy and the Internet: Welcome to the Orwellian
World, 11 J. Law & Pub. Pol'y 79, 83 (1999) (discussing how the Katz framework
has applied nicely to situations where society holds conventional notions of public
and private places).
68. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); see also O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709 (1987).
69. See Knopf, supra note 65, at 83.
70. See Skok, supra note 1, at 72.
71. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
72. Id. at 1184.
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court established that society would not recognize an expectation
of privacy in information a user passes online to an ISP when con-
tracting for Internet service. 74
Thus, the judicial decisions addressing personal privacy on the
Internet strongly suggest that a narrow interpretation of the Katz
analysis will be applied to determine if society will recognize an
expectation of privacy in URL and IP information. The first in-
quiry would undoubtedly address whether Carnivore enables ac-
cess to the content of the electronic communications of persons not
named in a court order. It is very improbable that, under a narrow
Katz application, a court would determine URL and IP information
to be "content" because each serves a function similar to that of a
telephone number. Also, if the judiciary is not willing to recognize
an equal expectation of privacy in electronic mail to that of posted
mail, the probability of successfully arguing that the protection of
information can be intercepted by law enforcement without intru-
sion into the body of the electronic communication it accompanies
is minimal.
The second inquiry in the Katz analysis would certainly focus
on whether the individual attempted to restrict third party access
to his URL or IP information. Again, the judiciary will likely con-
clude that users of the Internet must realize that they "convey"
their URL information since this information must travel through
the ISP's network to reach whatever destination is desired.75 The
court will likely, as it has often done when addressing Fourth
Amendment applicability to technological advances, attempt to
analogize the situation with a more traditional setting. In this
case, that traditional setting will undoubtedly be that established
in Smith and Miller.
From this examination, it seems unlikely that, even if an indi-
vidual can establish that he has a subjective expectation of privacy
in URL and IP information attached to his electronic transmis-
sions, the judiciary will determine that society is prepared to recog-
nize such expectation. Thus, Carnivore's interception of URL and
IP information relating to individuals not named in a court order is
73. 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Kan. 2000).
74. Id. at 1110.
75. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (reasoning that an individual realizes that he
must convey phone numbers he dials to his telephone company since his call is
completed through the company's switching equipment).
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not likely a search as determined under Fourth Amendment
principles.
If, in the alternative, the judiciary were to find the existence of
both a subjective and societal reasonable expectation of privacy in
URL and IP data, Carnivore would undoubtedly be conducting a
search of such information, and the next step in the constitutional
analysis would be to determine whether the search was a valid
one.
2. The Viewing of Addressing Information Inside Body of
Transmission
a. Is the Governmental Action a Fourth Amendment Search?
Electronic addressing information, such as URL or IP data,
can generally be intercepted by Carnivore without entering the
body of the accompanying electronic transmission.76 However,
there may be certain instances in which such information is lo-
cated only within the body of the communication, such as the "TO:"
line within an electronic message. This situation may occur when
the particular software used to transmit the communication does
not reveal the URL address to the ISP, but merely transmits the IP
address, or computer identification number.7 7 For example, if the
FBI has a court order to search for a particular URL, the device
may have to locate this information on the "TO:" line of the trans-
mission if the only information sent from the computer to the ISP
is its numerical IP address. Thus, in these cases it is highly proba-
ble that Carnivore will enter the body of transmissions sent or re-
ceived by people not subject to a court order as they flow through
the first filter point.
Some argue that this invasion, however slight, is an unautho-
rized warrantless search. Those who support this position rely on
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Arizona v. Hicks.78 In Hicks, the
Court held that a warrantless search premised on no judicially cre-
76. See Hearings 2, supra note 22.
77. See Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
78. 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (concerning a situation where law enforcement of-
ficers were legally on private premises investigating a shooting when an officer
noticed and certain stereo equipment within the home that he suspected was sto-
len. The officer slightly moved the equipment in order to obtain its serial number.
The Supreme Court held that although law enforcement was legally on the prem-
ises, the movement of the equipment constituted a warrantless search because an
action was taken by the officer to obtain information not otherwise available to
2001] 259
260 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:247
ated exception will be deemed violative of the Fourth Amendment
even if the governmental intrusion is minimal. The Court based its
decision in part on the fact that such intrusions may give law en-
forcement access to information that they would not otherwise be
legally entitled. Applying the Hicks reasoning, when Carnivore is
searching for URL information in the body of an electronic trans-
mission, although the intrusion is slight, the FBI may have access
to information within the communication that it would not other-
wise be legally entitled.
Although this reasoning has not yet been applied by the courts
to Internet communications, there is some evidence that suggests
that the judiciary would not favor this approach. In 1997, the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
(CALEA)79 was amended to allow telecommunications companies,
in certain instances, to provide the full content of customer com-
munications to the government. This is true even when the gov-
ernment is only authorized to intercept addressing information.80
The amendment relies on law enforcement to segregate the ad-
dressing information from the content of the messages. No court
has yet deemed the provision to be unconstitutional.8' Although
CALEA is not applicable to ISPs, the amendment and its judicial
acceptance is significant in that it illustrates again the trend of the
judiciary to place a lower value on, not only addressing informa-
tion, but electronic communications in general. Therefore, based
on the current inclination of the courts, Carnivore's invasion into
the body of communications not subject to investigation is not
likely to be considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
b. Assuming the Government Action is a Search, is it a Valid
Search?
Generally, a search is valid under the Fourth Amendment if it
is conducted via a warrant based on probable cause, or if it is rea-
him.); see also Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6 (statement of Alan B. Davidson,
Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (imposing a statutory obligation
on telecommunications providers to provide assistance to law enforcement when
presented with valid legal authorization; although CALEA regulates telecommuni-
cations, it has not yet been amended to include Internet Service Providers).
80. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 97-98.
81. See id.
FBI'S CARNIVORE
sonable.8 2 In implementing Carnivore, the FBI obviously has no
warrant authorizing the interception of electronic communications
of persons not named in a court order. Thus, the inquiry becomes
whether the FBI's intrusion on the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy is reasonable.8 3 In determining whether a governmental
search is reasonable, courts will generally first attempt to deter-
mine whether the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would re-
gard such action as unlawful.8 4 Where this inquiry yields no
definitive answer, the judiciary will ordinarily evaluate the search
under standards of reasonableness that have been developed
though judicial determinations in the area of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.8 5
Determining the reasonableness of the FBI's action regarding
Carnivore based on standards considered by the Framers may
prove to be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The concept of
searches of electronic communications was not a consideration of
the drafters of the amendment. Under standards that have been
delineated through numerous Fourth Amendment judicial deci-
sions, however, warrantless searches are generally recognized as
reasonable in a limited number of situations. Without enumerat-
ing all possible circumstances, the most plausible exception to the
warrant requirement likely to be presented by the FBI to justify
the operation of Carnivore is the existence of exigent circum-
stances.8 6 The judiciary has identified an exigent circumstance to
be one in which there is the danger that evidence will be destroyed
if law enforcement takes time to obtain a warrant.8 7 Also, an exi-
gent circumstance exists if law enforcement have a reasonable be-
lief that the safety of an agent or other innocent individuals is an
issue.88 An argument suggesting exigent circumstances in an elec-
82. See Frank W. Miller, et al., The Police Function 260 (6th ed. 2000).
83. See Skok, supra note 1, at 71.
84. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
85. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149
(MThe Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light of what was deemed an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will con-
serve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.").
86. Miller, supra note 73, at 261.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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tronic surveillance situation is weakened by the Supreme Court's
determination that such surveillance can be accomplished without
prior notification to the individual under investigation.8 9 Thus,
the risk that a suspect subject to surveillance by Carnivore will
destroy, or in this case, fail to transmit, electronic communications
in anticipation of FBI intervention is not likely to be viewed as
"reasonable" under the current interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Further, as an alternative to searching for a suspect's data by
identifying certain URL information, law enforcement could obtain
a warrant to conduct a search solely using IP information. This
type of information always accompanies electronic transmissions
and is always present in the header address location. Thus, the
need to enter the body of the transmission is eliminated. However,
such an alternative may not be a practical one. Most IP addresses
are temporary, and are assigned to a device when it is connected to
an ISP's network.90 These addresses frequently change and thus
likely cannot be electronically monitored for any significant period
of time.91
c. General Warrant Search of a Target Suspect
The second constitutional concern presented by the operation
of Carnivore focuses on the interception and collection of electronic
data attributable to the target suspect of the electronic surveil-
lance. Carnivore functions by copying all electronic data relating
to a target individual that is sent through a particular ISP's net-
work. When intercepting and copying such data, Carnivore can
employ an "Internet pen register function" or an "Internet wiretap-
ping function."92 The constitutional issue presented is whether ei-
ther of these functions present the risk of creating a general
warrant search of the target individual's communications.
Internet Pen Register Function
Carnivore's pen register function operates by copying and stor-
ing only authorized source and destination data, otherwise termed
89. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 n.16; see also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-
41 (1963).
90. See Latest IP Prompts Net Privacy Fears, Computing, Oct. 28, 1999, at 14.
91. See id.
92. See Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
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addressing information.93 This information, such as "to" and
"from" electronic mail addressing material, is expressly described
in a court order, and the FBI must store only such specified infor-
mation.94 All other copied data must be purged.95
As with communications relating to persons not named in a
court order, there are certain situations where Carnivore may
enter the body of a transmission pertaining to a named suspect to
facilitate the search for URL information. Privacy groups and
others are concerned that these circumstances transform an other-
wise valid court order into a general warrant because the FBI can
now search practically all of the communications sent to or from
the suspect.96 This is an important function when one considers
the extremely low standards for acquiring court authorization to
intercept source and destination information for electronic commu-
nications. 97 The standard, analogous to that of a subpoena or tele-
phone pen register, holds that a judge must approve practically
any surveillance request that can reasonably be expected to pro-
duce evidence relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.98
However, to obtain authorization to intercept the content of certain
electronic communications, the FBI must meet the much higher
standard applicable to wiretaps.99 It is therefore plausible that
Carnivore's pen register function allows the system to operate
under the impermissive authority of a general warrant.
Originally, Fourth Amendment protections were designed pri-
marily to protect individuals from the intrusive power wielded by
general warrants.100 However, modern judicial interpretation of
the Amendment has seemed to dilute these principles. 101 Nowhere
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is this more apparent than in
the judiciary's lenient interpretation of the minimization require-
93. See Hearings 2, supra note 22.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Donna Howell, Security & Privacy Studies Set to Flesh Out FBI's Car-
nivore, Investor's Bus. Daily, Aug. 28, 2000, at 8.
97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122-23 (1994).
98. See id.
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
100. See Christopher E. Torkelson, The Clipper Chip: How Key Escrow Threat-
ens to Undermine the Fourth Amendment, 25 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1142, 1175 n.90
(1995).
101. See id; see also Larry Dowries, Electronic Communications and the Plain
View Exception: More "Bad Physics," 7 Harv. J. Law & Tech. 239, 278 (1994).
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ments mandated in the federal wiretap laws.' 0 2 Substantial evi-
dence suggests that the interception of unauthorized information
attributable to a target suspect during the conduct of an electronic
surveillance is rarely even frowned upon by the courts.103 In fact,
law enforcement is often afforded judicial tolerance when certain
technical or practical difficulties inhibit their ability to minimize
the interception of such data. 10 4 Reasoning from this perspective,
Carnivore's inability to consistently intercept addressing or rout-
ing information without entering the body of an electronic trans-
mission is likely to be allowed by the courts and not viewed as an
unconstitutional general warrant search of the target suspect's
communications.
Internet Wiretap Function
Carnivore's wiretapping function operates by searching all of
the target suspect's Internet communications for key words or
phrases that are described in a court order.' 0 5 Although the FBI
copies all transmissions pertaining to the suspect, it must store
only communications containing such key words or phrases, and
purge all other information.10 6 This "stored" data is sent to an FBI
facility for subsequent examination by FBI agents.' 0 7
Similar to the Internet pen register function, advocates of
greater privacy protections on the Internet are worried that this
procedure may also present a danger of a general warrant.' 08
Those promoting this position believe there is a risk that a trans-
mission could contain the specified "key word or phrase" but not be
relevant to the government's investigation. 10 9 For example, if a
key word such as "drugs" is authorized, the FBI might collect and
review a target suspect's communication consisting of anything
from a request submitted to a website concerning new drugs avail-
able for AIDS patients, to cures for the common cold. The IITRI
report seems to concede this possibility. It states that while the
102. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
103. See Scott v. United States, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also United
States v. Ozar, 50 F3d. 1440 (8th Cir. 1995).
104. See id.
105. See Carnivore's Challenge, supra note 6.
106. See id.
107. See Hearings 2, supra note 22.
108. See Carnivore's Controversy, supra note 6.
109. See id.
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system is designed to, and can, perform fine-tuned searches, it is
also capable of broad sweeps. 110 Incorrectly configured, Carnivore
can record any traffic it monitors."' The report goes on to state
that this possibility may be increased due to the lack of adequate
audit trail provisions or safeguards against common configuration
errors."12
However, like the pen register function, the relaxed minimiza-
tion requirements applied by the judiciary to more traditional
wiretap investigations are likely to be similarly applied to Internet
taps. Therefore, the FBI's erroneous collection and storage of tar-
get suspect material not relevant to the surveillance is probably
constitutionally permissible.
Upon analysis, it appears that the FBI's implementation and
utilization of Carnivore is in compliance with Constitutional prin-
ciples, at least so far as these principles are currently interpreted.
The next stage of the legal analysis addresses whether or not the
application of Carnivore complies with federal statutory wiretap
laws.
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The legitimacy of the Carnivore surveillance system can also
be analyzed in a statutory context. The focal points of such an
analysis are the privacy protections included in such provisions
that add to the constitutional minimum. Once these added safe-
guards are determined, an assessment of how the judiciary is
likely to interpret and apply such provisions must be made. The
following presents a commensurate examination of the federal
statutory provisions applicable to Carnivore, as well as the proba-
ble judicial opinion as to Carnivore's compliance with such
requirements.
In 1968, one year after Katz, Congress passed Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.113 This act permit-
ted non-consensual wire or oral eavesdropping by the government
as long as the surveillance was done pursuant to the requirements
110. See Brian Krebs, Study Calls For Stronger Audit Trail In FBI's Carnivore,
Newsbytes, Nov. 21, 2000.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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delineated in the act.114 In 1986, Congress amended Title III by
passing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (EPCA).115
The ECPA was intended to enhance Title III by establishing
definitive rules for electronic surveillance. 1 6 In drafting the
ECPA, Congress included certain privacy "protections" that under-
lie the essential purpose of the statute. These protections can be
grouped into three categories." 7 First, any attempted electronic
surveillance is subject to stringent ex parte judicial review. Sec-
ond, those conducting the electronic surveillance must minimize
the interception of non-pertinent information during the surveil-
lance. Third, the conduct of and results derived from an author-
ized electronic surveillance may be subject to a stringent
adversarial review after the surveillance has been completed. 118
An analysis will show that these protections, although embod-
ied in the language of the ECPA, have been significantly dimin-
ished through judicial interpretation and action. Thus, the
utilization of Carnivore, arguably an extremely invasive investiga-
tive tool, is likely to be in full compliance with the federal statutory
requirements of the ECPA.
Ex Parte Judicial Review
EPCA Section 2518 provides that upon an application for a
surveillance order, the issuing judge may enter an ex parte order
authorizing interception of the electronic communications. 1 9 In
issuing such order, the judge must determine primarily that (1)
there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a specific offense enumerated
in the statute; (2) there is probable cause for belief that particular
communications concerning that offense will be obtained through
such interception; and (3) normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or may be too dangerous.120
114. See id.
115. See Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Inves-
tigation 190 (2d ed. 1998).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1986).
117. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 85.
118. See id.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
120. Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 46, at 85.
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The FBI has applied for and received approximately twenty-
five court orders approving the use of Carnivore in the past two
years. 121 Although it is unclear what information was presented to
obtain such surveillance orders, the majority of courts have gener-
ally applied the same sufficiency of evidence standard for estab-
lishing probable cause for electronic surveillance warrants as
required for more traditional warrants. 122 Thus, it is likely that
all twenty-five surveillance requests were supported by sufficient
probable cause.
The judicial application of Section 2518 (3) presents a more
elusive question. Although the statutory language expressly man-
dates that normal investigative procedures generally be tried and
failed before electronic surveillance should be authorized, in many
jurisdictions, evidence strongly suggests this procedure is not ad-
hered to. Some courts authorize electronic wiretapping before all
other investigative techniques have been exhausted. In these ju-
risdictions, in order to obtain a warrant authorizing interception of
such communications, the government need only show that other
techniques would be "impracticable under the circumstances." 23
In other jurisdictions, law enforcement only has to state a "likeli-
hood of failure" of other investigative techniques in their affidavit
for a search warrant.124
This trend is also reflected statistically. Between 1968 and
1995, federal and state courts approved 20,107 surveillance appli-
cations and denied only 27, with none denied since 1988. Further,
from the 349 federal taps authorized in 1991, 1022 persons were
arrested and 292, or about .08% of the total number under surveil-
lance, were convicted.' 25
Thus, based on this persuasive data, it is possible that so long
as the FBI can establish probable cause for a particular investiga-
tion, it can obtain an order to implement Carnivore without
121. See Hearings 2, supra note 22 (statement of Donald Kerr, Asst. Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
122. See generally United States v. Clements, 588 F.2d 1030 (1979) (finding
probable cause existed based on information provided by three informants and in-
dependently corroborated by police); United States v. Wagner, 989 F.2d 69 (1993)
(finding probable cause existed based on information provided by informant that
had made eight previous drug purchases under police supervision).
123. United States v. Cooper, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2000).
124. United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847 (1976).
125. See Slobogin, supra note 112, at 190.
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presenting evidence of an attempt to utilize more conventional in-
vestigative techniques, and still be in full compliance with the stat-
utory requirements.
Major Crimes Only
In drafting the original Title III, Congress recognized that
wiretapping created a significant opportunity for abuse, and there-
fore should be limited in its use. Thus, the Legislature expressly
stated that "interception of... communications should.., be lim-
ited to certain major types of offenses and specific categories of
crime with assurances that the interception is justified and that
the information obtained thereby will not be misused." 126
However, the list of offenses for which wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance are permitted under Title III and the EPCA has
increased from 26 in 1968 to 95 in 1996.127 The list has expanded
from espionage, treason, violent crimes, and offenses typically as-
sociated with organized crime, to include such cases as those in-
volving false statements on passport applications and loan
applications. 128 Further, by and large, electronic surveillance is
primarily used in drug cases. In 1996, 71% of wiretaps nationwide
were issued for drug cases.129
The FBI has stated that its use of Carnivore has complied with
the "major crimes" requirement of Title III, primarily focusing on
cases such as those involving the illegal solicitation of sex with mi-
nors and security issues concerning illegal bomb making activi-
ties.'30 The Bureau has also acknowledged possible use of the
device in narcotics investigations.'13 In light of the expanded list
of legislatively approved uses for electronic surveillance, the FBI's
assertion of compliance with the statute is correct, and Carnivore
is being utilized well within the statutory guidelines.
126. Omnibus Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801,
82 Stat. 211 (1968).
127. 18 U.S.C § 2516 (1994); see also Dempsey, supra note 46, at 76-77.
128. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 76.
129. Id.
130. See Qaisar Alam, E-Mail Surveillance: Carnivore Cornered, Computers
Today, Oct. 31, 2000, at 48.
131. See Danny A. Defenbaugh, FBI's Carnivore Software, Dallas Morning
News, Aug. 27, 2000, at 4J.
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Minimization of Non-Pertinent Information
The EPCA requires that electronic surveillance "be conducted
in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception."132 However, similar to the
other two statutorily enumerated protections, the minimization re-
quirement has not been strictly enforced by the courts.'33 It ap-
pears that any explanation for law enforcement's failure to
minimize will suffice to justify their actions. For instance, in Scott
v. United States, 13 4 the D.C. Circuit held that the complete record-
ing of all conversations on a phone line used by a suspect was ac-
ceptable despite the fact that 60% of calls were not pertinent to the
investigation. The court accepted the failure to minimize on law
enforcement's explanation that the suspect often used coded lan-
guage in brief conversations. Thus it was necessary for law en-
forcement to listen to all calls to determine their relevancy.' 35
Similarly, in United States v. Ozar,'3 6 the Eighth Circuit up-
held the FBI's method of listening to two out of every three min-
utes of every phone conversation. In Ozar, the government
intercepted a total of 8,126 minutes of the suspect's telephone con-
versations, of which 223 minutes, or 2.75% were deemed pertinent
to the investigation. 137 The FBI explained that it was necessary to
listen to a large number of conversations to determine their rele-
vancy, not because they were short and coded, as in Scott, but be-
cause they were lengthy and contained complicated subject
matter.138
The Carnivore system cannot be implemented without inter-
cepting electronic transmissions unrelated to the target suspect.' 3 9
Also, the system operates by intercepting and copying all commu-
nications sent to or received by an individual under surveil-
lance. 140 Thus, a situation requiring effective minimization of
information not pertinent to the investigation is very much
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
133. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
134. 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
135. Scott, 516 F.2d at 755.
136. 50 F.3d 1440 (8th Cir. 1995); see Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
137. Ozar, 50 F.3d at 1448.
138. Id.; see also Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
139. See Hearings 1, supra note 15 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
140. See Hearings 2, supra note 22 (statement of Donald Kerr, Asst. Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
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presented. However, based on the collective reasoning applied by
the judiciary, it appears improbable that a failure by the FBI to
adequately minimize the interception of such data while imple-
menting Carnivore would have any significant statutory
ramifications.
Post-Surveillance Judicial Review
EPCA provides that that an individual who is subject to gov-
ernment conducted electronic surveillance is entitled to an after-
the-fact judicial review of the authorization and conduct of the sur-
veillance. 141 However, the EPCA currently contains no exclusion-
ary provision for illegally obtained electronic transmissions in
transit. 142 Arguably, this would be the type of electronic informa-
tion Carnivore expressly targets. A proposed amendment to the
EPCA suggests the implementation of such a provision, 143 but
judging from the application of exclusionary provisions applicable
to wire and oral communications, it is not encouraging that such a
provision would be effective. Statistics indicate that a defendant's
after-the-fact challenges to the authorization or conduct of oral and
wire surveillance are rarely sustained.'44 Between 1985 and 1994,
judges nationwide granted 138 suppression motions while denying
3,060, for a 4.3% suppression rate. 145 In light of this data, it seems
highly improbable that even after the enactment of an applicable
exclusionary provision, any party attempting to challenge the con-
duct of an electronic surveillance utilizing Carnivore would be suc-
cessful. From this analysis, it is presumable that the use of
141. See Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access to Advanced Telecom-
munications Technologies and Services: Joint Hearings on H.R. 4922 and S. 2375
Before the Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 6 (1994) (testimony of Louis J. Freeh).
142. See Hearings on H.R. 5018, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
2000; H.R. 4987, Digital Privacy Act of 2000; and H.R. 4908, Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative
Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
143. See Hearings on H.R. 5018, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
2000; H.R. 4987, Digital Privacy Act of 2000; and H.R. 4908, Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Robert Come-Revere).
144. See Robert Plotkin, Breaking the Code: Excluding Illegal Wiretap Evi-
dence, 10 BNA Crim. Prac. Manual 432 (1996).
145. See Dempsey, supra note 46, at 77.
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Carnivore would not be deemed to violate the privacy protections
embodied in Title III and the EPCA.
CONCLUSION
The information and analysis presented in this comment sup-
ports the conclusion that the FBI's Carnivore surveillance device is
likely to be in compliance with both constitutional and federal stat-
utory requirements. However, in light of citizen concern and un-
certainty concerning the utilization of Carnivore, I briefly propose
two plausible solutions that would likely quell, or at least dimin-
ish, these fears and concerns while still achieving the government
objective. These proposals are as follows:
First, the FBI could replace Carnivore with a less invasive sur-
veillance system. Since the existence of Carnivore was made pub-
lic last year, several software companies have developed
alternatives. One such alternative, "Altivore,"146 works much like
Carnivore. However, unlike Carnivore, Altivore allows for the col-
lection of just one stream of data as the information flows through
the device, thus reducing some fear that unauthorized data is be-
ing intercepted. 147
Second, ISPs should be given some collaborative role in the
conduct of the surveillance. Carnivore, in departure from ordinary
telephone taps, inserts the FBI into the ISP's network. 148 In fact,
the ISP has no role in the surveillance once the ISP assists the FBI
in connecting to its network.149 Like CALEA, the EPCA should be
amended to require ISP assistance in the collection of data from its
network. In addition, the FBI should make the technology of Car-
nivore, including the source code and the right to modify it, availa-
ble to any ISP that needs to comply with a surveillance order. The
involvement of the ISP would serve to confirm exactly what the
operating capabilities of the system really are.
Obviously, these recommendations are not all of the possible
solutions that could effectively balance the interest of Internet
users with that of the Government. Yet, whatever resolution is se-
146. See Ann Harrison, Security Software Vendor Develops Carnivore E-Mail
Monitoring Alternative, Infoworld Daily News, Sept. 21, 2000.
147. See id.
148. See Dempsey, supra note 19, at A03.
149. See id.; see also Hearings 1, supra note 15 (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
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lected, American society must act quickly if it wishes to preserve
fundamental Fourth Amendment protections as it moves further
and further into the technology age. Without a doubt, in light of
the uncertain and inadequate legal and judicial guidance currently
applicable to the Internet forum, we have a very long way to go.
Patricia K. Holmes
